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Devin Ramon Duque: A Compromise towards Inter-Regionalism: The case of the EU-Mercosur 
Agreement 
(Under the direction of Dr. Klaus Larres) 
The EU-Mercosur free-trade agreement was believed by most European and Latin American 
scholars to be unattainable. Yet, after decades of negotiations and changes between both the 
European Union and Mercosur, the agreement was struck between both blocs on 29 June 2019. 
While the EU was initially drawn to Mercosur due to the possibility of inter-regionalism, this 
agreement provides a glimpse of the European Union’s foreign policy objectives as well as the 
goals of key member states and the desires of Mercosur member states. By assessing the EU-
Mercosur free-trade agreement from a multi-level perspective one can see that the goals of the 
European Union, the EU’s key member states, and Mercosur member states are different. Overall 
in order to achieve their objectives compromise is needed. Through this compromise all sides 
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Negotiations between the European Union and the Southern Common Market referred 
more commonly as Mercosur, which compromise of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay 
represent the oldest negotiations between two regional trading blocs in modern history. The EU-
Mercosur trade agreement represents not only the possibility of a market comprised of over 700 
million consumers but also the promise of extending the European regional model to another 
continent. However, since 2004 the possibility of an agreement was viewed by many as either 
elusive and more critically by others as an idealistic notion of inter-regionalism.1 Why then, after 
decades of negotiations, have these two trading blocs finalized this agreement?  
 In order to answer this question, one needs to first assess the history of EU and Mercosur 
relations from 1986 until 2004. The European Economic Community had no formal relations 
with Mercosur members before 1986. In fact, prior to 1986, all EEC documents related to Latin 
America were written in either English or French despite Spanish and Portuguese being the 
predominant languages for this area.2 The European Community’s change in attitude toward 
Latin America was due primarily to the ascensions of both Spain and Portugal as members of the 
EEC in 1986. By joining the EEC, Spain and Portugal benefited from European trade and the 
European community also prioritized the national foreign policy of these members. This thesis 
                                                 
1 Susanne Gratius, “Brazil and the European Union: From Liberal Inter-Regionalism to Realist Bilateralism,” 
Revista Brasileira De Política Internacional 61, no. 1 (2018), 1. 
 
2 Arantza Gomez Arana, The European Union’s Policy towards MERCOSUR: Responsive Not Strategic 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 73.  
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will discuss how the enlargement of the EU to include both Spain and Portugal set the stage of 
path dependence, thus propelling the EU to become more involved in Latin America.  
 At the same time, Latin America experienced a period of increased democratization, a 
desire to promote market-oriented policies within the continent, and witnessed the end of the 
Cold War. While the United States remains one of the largest trading partners for the region, in a 
globalized world Latin America viewed Europe as a new potential trading partner and as a means 
to lessen the influence of the United States. These factors led Mercosur member states to initiate 
negotiations with the European Union. Therefore, one must assess the history of Mercosur states 
to understand the desire to push such an agreement.  
 Despite the eagerness of EU and Mercosur member states to come to a consensus in 
2004, negotiators failed to reach an agreement. From this moment until the eventual signing of 
the agreement, an additional fifteen years passed. During this time, both Mercosur as well as the 
EU and their member states significantly changed. In the case of Latin America, leaders from the 
leftist Pink Tide movement would rise and continue to affect the politics of these countries. 
Brazil during this time transformed its economy and became the economic superpower of South 
America. Despite Brazil’s economic downturn after 2014, corruption cases associated with the 
Car Wash Scandal, and the election of populist President Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil remains the 
largest and most influential economy within Mercosur. At the same time, China’s influence 
within Latin America has grown substantially to the point that China is the number one exporter 
for Brazil.3 Thus, these factors will be evaluated in assessing the future of the EU-Mercosur 
agreement.  
                                                 
3 Douglas Farah and Kathryn Babineau, “Extra-Regional Actors in Latin America: The United States Is Not the 
Only Game in Town,” Prism 8, no. 1 (2019): pp. 96-113.  
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The European Union has experienced significant changes from the economic crisis of 
2008, to the rise of its populist leaders and the infamous Brexit referendum of June 2016. 
However, despite these changes, the European Union remains a champion for multi-nationalism 
and market-oriented policies amid increasing protectionist attitudes. This work intends to argue 
that just as the identities of these regional economic blocs and their member states have changed 
since negotiations between the two groups began, so too have the dynamics and, most 
importantly, the desires of both parties to complete this agreement. The theories of path 
dependence and inter-regionalism will be discussed as forces that have driven negotiations 
between Mercosur and the European Union. However, one cannot discount the importance of 
realist foreign policy aspirations when assessing this agreement. The goals of the European 
Union, as well as the desires of individual EU member states, must be considered. For example, 
many leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron criticized the EU-Mercosur 
agreement over Brazil’s environmental policies and Bolsonaro’s encouragement of 
environmentally destructive industries such as mining and cattle ranching within the Amazon. 
Extreme fires that tore through the Amazon rainforest in 2019 helped to elevate Macron’s 
criticism of Bolsonaro. However, Macron’s criticism could also be considered an episode of 
political theater. By taking a hard stance against Bolsonaro, Macron can use this to boost his 
popularity among members of his party and insist that France play a more significant role within 
the European Union.  
This thesis intends to argue that understanding why European and South American 
leaders are adamant in support of this agreement requires a multi-level approach. The goals of 
leaders within the European Union, the desires of influential member states within the EU, 
namely France and Germany, and the aspirations of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro are the 
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forces propelling this agreement. In a world that is becoming increasingly more isolated and 
skeptical of multilateral institutions, the EU needs a foreign policy victory. Under new European 
Commissioner Ursula von der Leyen, the EU intends to use its market power in order to become 
a greater geopolitical actor and guardian of multilateralism.4 By supporting a regional trading 
bloc, the EU hopes to mold Mercosur and other organizations in its image.  
President Jair Bolsonaro likely seeks only to improve Brazil’s economic interests and not 
that of Mercosur. However, by supporting the EU-Mercosur agreement and Brazil’s membership 
into the OECD, Bolsonaro views Mercosur as a stepping stone to support opening Brazil’s 
economy to the world in order to attract further investment. While the effects of the coronavirus 
may give pause to the future of globalization, foreign aid will also be needed in Latin America in 
order to support health care in this region. The EU should be a driving force for change, 
delivering this aid to Mercosur states.   
In all cases, compromise is needed for all of these leaders to achieve their foreign policy 
priorities. In the case of the EU, the EU must choose between maintaining its highly regulated 
agricultural sector or making concessions in order to achieve an EU-Mercosur agreement. 
Leaders of EU member states must strike a delicate balance between their electoral agendas and 
fortifying the EU in a multi-polar world. Moreover, Bolsonaro, as well as other Latin American 
leaders, must choose multi-nationalism in order to open their economies to outside investment. 




                                                 
4 Editorial Board , “A Commission to Stand up for Europe's Interests,” Financial Times (Financial Times, 
September 10, 2019) 
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CHAPTER 2: A HISTORY OF EU-MERCOSUR RELATIONS 1986-2004
Introduction 
In order to understand the history behind Mercosur, one must first understand the history 
of Mercosur’s member states. Mercosur is comprised of the countries of Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay. While the organization was formed officially in 1991, this regional bloc 
quickly gained the attention of the European Union. Before Mercosur’s formation, its member 
states hardly represented champions of human rights, which the European Union demands of its 
trading partners or even showed desires for integration. For example, until the 1970s, Brazil was 
engaged in frontier disputes with its neighbors.5 Both Brazil and Argentina did not begin to 
cooperate until at the onset of the Falkland War in which Brazil supported Argentina’s invasion.6 
All of Mercosur’s member states in the decades before its formation could also be characterized 
as quasi-democracies controlled by military juntas or personal dictators that received significant 
support from the United States.7 Despite this, these countries rapidly transformed their 
economies and their societies and gained the attention of the EU as a viable regional organization 
in Latin America.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Arantza Gomez Arana, The European UNION'S Policy towards MERCOSUR: Responsive Not Strategic 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 11.  
 
6 Ibid., 12.  
 
7 Ibid., 13.  
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Section 2.1. Beginnings of Mercosur 
Except for Paraguay, by the mid-1980s, almost all Mercosur member states began to 
experience a gradual push towards democracy and increased freedoms. At the same time, these 
states proposed a common market that would bring South America’s largest economies, 
Argentina and Brazil, to the table in order to decrease tariffs and promote a more integrated 
economy. The Argentina-Brazil Integration and Economics Cooperation Program, founded in 
1985, later led to the signing of the Act of Cooperation and Integration between both countries in 
1986. In July 1990, the Act of Buenos Aires was signed, establishing a Common Market by 
December 1994. Later in 1990, Brazil and Argentina invited Uruguay and Paraguay to join. On 
26 March 1991, all four parties signed the Treaty of Asunción, officially creating the Common 
Market of the South.  
 Regional organizations did exist in Latin America before Mercosur, such as the 
Organization of Central American States, the Latin American Free Trade Association, and the 
Andean Pact.8 The Organization of American States (OAS) was founded in 1948; however, in 
the case of the OAS, this organization is considered a loose confederation of states with strong 
ties towards promoting US foreign policy objectives. In comparison to all of these organizations, 
Mercosur is considered to be the most integrated regional group in Latin America and one of the 
most integrated regional blocs outside of the European Union.9  
 Despite an original treaty consisting of only twenty-five pages and twenty-four articles, 
the structure of Mercosur mirrored the early European Economic Community’s 
                                                 
8 Arantza Gomez Arana, The European UNION'S Policy towards MERCOSUR: Responsive Not Strategic 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 13. 
 
9 Ibid., 13. 
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intergovernmental structure. Mercosur’s decision-making bodies are the Common Market 
Council (CMC), the Common Market Group (CMG), and the Trade Commission (TC), with the 
CMG serving as the executive body responsible for carrying out resolutions passed by the CMC. 
CMG is also in charge of negotiations between Mercosur and third parties, and the TC provides 
guidance and produces directives under these circumstances. The counseling groups, such as the 
Commission of Permanent Representatives, the Economic and Social Consultative Forum, meet 
with the CMC regarding Mercosur integration. Just as the European Commission has a President, 
Mercosur has an administrative secretariat. The organization also has a president pro tempore 
that holds office every six months, which is rotated between the heads of different Mercosur 
member states.  
 Upon receiving its international legal powers on 1 January 1995, Mercosur signed the 
Europe-Mercosur Inter-regional Framework for Cooperation (EMIFCA). The EMIFCA 
represented an agreement that the EU began providing technical assistance to Mercosur and 
begin negotiations regarding a free-trade agreement. After forming in 1991, Mercosur quickly 
sought out help from the EU. Unfortunately, EU policy towards Mercosur and Latin America has 
been described by authors as ill-conceived and without a clear strategy.10 It was only due to the 
ascension of Spain and Portugal that the EU began exploring relations with Mercosur, which sat 
the EU down a path of contributing to the goals of Spanish and Portuguese national foreign 
policy initiatives.  
Section 2.2. Ascension of Spain and Portugal  
The history of the European Union’s relationship with Latin America is linked to the 
ascensions of both Spain and Portugal into the EEC in 1986. While the EU was responsible for 
                                                 
10 Arantza Gomez Arana, The European UNION'S Policy towards MERCOSUR: Responsive Not Strategic 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 121.  
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promoting peace negotiations between Central American nations in 1984 through the San José 
dialogue, the EU’s foreign policy strategy for Latin America was directly tied to Mercosur. As 
Arana states in her work The European Union’s policy towards Mercosur: Responsive not 
Strategic, “For most of the period up to 1995, EU policy towards Latin America was 
synonymous with Mercosur.”11  This desire to cultivate relations with Mercosur began right after 
Portugal and Spain gained membership status because just as these member states became 
incorporated within the EU, their national foreign policies became priorities of the European 
Union.  
 Ben Tonra, in his book The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy, defines 
Europeanization as: 
“A transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed in the 
ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent 
internationalization and norms and expectations arising from a complex system of 
collective European policymaking.”12 
 
Just as member states become accustomed to the standards and form part of a constructed 
European community, so too does the European Union upload and project the foreign policy 
goals of these member states. Wong, in his work featured in Europeanization: New Research 
Agendas, takes this analysis further, arguing that due to Spain and Portugal’s ascensions, both 
countries prioritized the foreign policy objectives of the EU over their objectives with Latin 
America.13  
                                                 
11 Arantza Gomez Arana, The European UNION'S Policy towards MERCOSUR: Responsive Not Strategic 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 23.  
 
12 Ben Tonra, The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the 
European Union (Farnham, United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing , 2001), 229 
 
13 Richard Wong , “Foreign Policy,” in Europeanization: New Research Agendas, ed. Paolo Graziano and Maarten 
Peter Vink (New York , NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
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While it is true that both Spain and Portugal chose to join the European Union due to how 
dependent their economies were on trade with EU member states, both countries began to 
rekindle special relationships with their former Latin American colonies. This relationship was 
not built on previous power dynamics of Iberian superiority but based on partnership.14 
Therefore, it is no coincidence that the same day that both Spain and Portugal signed the Treaty 
of Ascension in Madrid on 12 June 1985, the EU also finalized the ‘Joint Declaration of Intent 
on the Development and Intensification of Relations with the Countries of Latin America’15 
announcing its intent to help with the economic and social development of Latin America. This 
declaration was not only a direct result of Spain and Portugal becoming members of the EU, but 
more importantly, this declaration led to a series of chain reactions igniting EU-Mercosur 
relations.16  
 While general European commitment and ambition to promote relations with Latin 
America were low during this period, Spanish and Portuguese involvement with the European 
Union illustrates that these states began to influence EU foreign policy towards Latin America 
and, in turn, promote relations with Mercosur. European leaders acknowledged the potential 
European and Latin American relationship with Spain and Portugal’s membership. The former 
chancellor of West Germany, Helmut Kohl, stated that Spain and Portugal could serve as 
‘intermediaries of exceptional category between Europe and Latin America.’17 Spanish and 
                                                 
14 Howard Wiarda, “The Transition to Democracy in Spain and Portugal ,” AEI (American Enterprise Institute , 
1989), 200.  
 
15 Arantza Gomez Arana, The European UNION'S Policy towards MERCOSUR: Responsive Not Strategic 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 88. 
 




Portuguese ministers within EU institutions were given the opportunity to set policy towards 
Latin America, thus creating a path towards relations between the EU and Mercosur.   
  Following the 1986 enlargement, the EU signed a wave of trade agreements with Latin 
American nations and quickly became one of the most crucial aid donors to Latin America. Part 
of the increase in agreements was that the Commission in 1986 had called for the creation of new 
instruments for cooperation with developing countries in Latin America, Asia, and the 
Mediterranean.18 The new guidelines referred to as the ‘Guidelines for cooperation with 
developing countries of Latin America and Asia’ led to an increase in funds for aid and 
economic cooperation.19 Factors such as increased aid to developing Latin American states and 
allowing Latin American nations to benefit from the EU’s market through Generalized Scheme 
of Preferences (GSP), which provides developing countries the opportunity to sell certain 
products within the EU market without facing tariffs, increased European influence in the 
region.20  
Through annual meetings between the EU and the Rio Group,21 the EU was able to sign 
cooperation agreements with several Latin American countries, including member states within 
                                                 
17 Arantza Gomez Arana, The European UNION'S Policy towards MERCOSUR: Responsive Not Strategic 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 96.  
 
18 Council Regulation European Economic Community , “EC Investment Partners Financial Instrument for Asian, 
Latin American and Mediterranean Countries ,” 395 EC Investment Partners Financial Instrument for Asian, Latin 
American and Mediterranean Countries § (1991).  
 
19 Arantza Gomez Arana, The European UNION'S Policy towards MERCOSUR: Responsive Not Strategic 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 88. 
 
20 European Commission, “European Commission Directorate-General for Trade,” Generalized Scheme of 
Preferences (GSP) – Trade – European Commission (European Union, May 29, 2020). 
 
21 An association of Latin American and Caribbean States formed in 1986 which was dissolved and later formed as 
the Community of Latin American and Caribbean states after 2011. 
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Mercosur. However, it is because of these meetings that Spanish and Portuguese ministers 
established relationships between EU and Mercosur leaders, which played a role in igniting 
negotiations between the EU and Mercosur. In 1992 Portugal held the EU presidency, and that 
same year Mercosur representatives met with European Union foreign ministers led by 
Portuguese minister, Abel Matutes, head of relations in Latin America and Asia in May 1992. 
Days later, the first Inter-institutional Cooperation Agreement was signed by the Commission of 
European Communities and the Mercosur Council. Later Spanish minister, Manuel Marin, was 
named leader of EU External Relations and took over Matutes post in 1993. Marin strengthened 
relations between the EU and Mercosur, staging a series of diplomatic meetings with Mercosur 
leaders coinciding with EU-Rio Group meetings in April 1994. This led to further talks in 1994 
in which EU commissioners stated a desire to strengthen their relations with Mercosur. These 
meetings eventually led to the signing of the EMIFCA, an agreement to pursue an inter-regional 
association.22 These negotiations were driven by the membership of Spanish and Portuguese 
representatives. They not only set meetings between the high-level ministers and Mercosur 
representatives but more importantly, set the agenda for the EU’s policy towards Latin America. 
This further demonstrates the path dependence created by Iberian countries and their leaders 
upon joining the EU.23  
  Through pressure by Spanish and Portuguese ministers, more European leaders became 
aware of the regional potential of Mercosur. The organization comprised of the largest 
economies in Latin America with both Brazil and Argentina was seen as a potential model of the 
                                                 
22 Arantza Gomez Arana, The European UNION'S Policy towards MERCOSUR: Responsive Not Strategic 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 121. 
 
23 Ibid., 121.  
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European Union in Latin America. Europe, following the end of the Cold War, began to push for 
a global agenda and to support globalization as a means of interconnection. For example, after a 
visit to Latin America, former EU Commission President Jacques Delors stressed in an interview 
that ‘there was a need to control interdependency together…the planet today is becoming a 
village.’24 EU leaders viewed Mercosur as a means to promote EU foreign policy by establishing 
a regional partner organization. By the early to mid-1990s, Mercosur member states had not only 
improved their economic output but also were taking steps to support human rights initiatives 
within their countries after years of authoritarian rule. This served as an example of what the EU 
wanted to support, and this compelled the EU to support this regional institution and to promote 
this trade agreement.  
Section 2.3. Negotiations between 1999 and 2004  
Negotiations between the EU and Mercosur brought with it the opportunity to pursue an 
inter-regional agreement and to promote the EU’s model globally. As José Antonio Sanahuja 
states in his article The European Union and Latin American Regionalism: A Balance, “The EU 
has wanted to see in Latin America and the Caribbean a mirror image of its own experience of 
integration, development, social cohesion and by insisting on the development of democratic 
values and human rights, this led the EU to prioritize regional agreements.”25 Mercosur 
represented a prime example of a potential regional organization in Latin America, and this 
drove EU ministers to pursue an association agreement.  
                                                 
24 Arantza Gomez Arana, The European UNION'S Policy towards MERCOSUR: Responsive Not Strategic 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 115.  
 
25 José Antonio Sanahuja, “The European Union and Latin American Regionalism: a Balance,” Investigación & 
Desarrollo 21, no. 1 (2013), 159.  
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An association agreement goes far beyond the waves of cooperation agreements that the 
EU had pursued in the early 1990s. The EMIFCA represented not only an agreement with the 
establishment of a free trade area between the two organizations, but also the promotion of 
strategic investment by firms and, most notably, to strengthen political cooperation at the 
international level.26 Mercosur members were also asked to take joint positions with the EU in 
international forums on issues of mutual interest, such as world peace and security.27 This 
agreement ultimately demonstrates a very high level of ambition and commitment among both 
parties. As former European Commissioner for Trade, Pascal Lamy stated, “Why does the EU 
care about Mercosur? Because above and beyond providing a market to our exports and stability 
to the region, Mercosur reinforces the multi-polar nature of the international system.”28 This 
promotes the concept that the EU saw Mercosur as a means to further its foreign policy goals in 
support of democracy and human rights and that Mercosur represented a priority at the highest 
levels of EU leadership.  
 In addition to the support of inter-regionalism Spanish and Portuguese ministers 
continued to promote this agreement within EU forums. For example, the EMIFCA was signed 
in 1995 in Madrid while Spain held the EU presidency.29 Spanish minister Manuel Marin led EU 
sub-committees on approving this agreement. Interviews from EU and Mercosur ministers tell 
that Spanish commissioners were said to be more willing to give better offers, and prepared to 
                                                 
26 Arantza Gomez Arana, The European UNION'S Policy towards MERCOSUR: Responsive Not Strategic 




28 Ibid., 168.  
 
29 Ibid., 148.  
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give Mercosur actors honest assessments of their demands.30 Ultimately Spanish and Portuguese 
ministers helped to propel these negotiations.  
 The Post-Cold War era cannot be underscored as a factor that pushed the EU and 
Mercosur member states toward an agreement. Latin American states were given a chance to 
diversify their trading partners and, more importantly, the opportunity to become less dependent 
on the United States. A motivation for the EU to sign a significant free-trade agreement with a 
regional organization in Latin America illustrates a desire to counter-act American hegemony.31 
Mercosur member states also demonstrated an intense desire to promote relations with the EU. 
Representatives of Mercosur member states were the first to negotiate with EU ministers. Also, 
Mercosur member states were willing to pressure EU member states at their embassies to make 
concessions. This led France, one of the most prominent critics of the agreement, to approve a 
deal placed by an EU subcommittee despite then-president Jacques Chirac’s public disapproval 
of the deal.32 The desire for other EU member states to compete against the United States in the 
region also represents a post-cold war dynamic. For example, between 1991 and 1997, Germany 
contributed more official development aid (ODA) to Latin America than any other EU member 
state and contributed double that of the United States.33 Therefore, there was an attempt by EU 
member states to impact Latin America. 
                                                 
30 Arantza Gomez Arana, The European UNION'S Policy towards MERCOSUR: Responsive Not Strategic 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 167. 
 
31 Vinod K. Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty, EU Trade Strategies: between Regionalism and Globalism 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
 
32 Ibid., 155.  
 
33 Arantza Gomez Arana, The European UNION'S Policy towards MERCOSUR: Responsive Not Strategic 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 141. 
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Unfortunately, there were substantial reasons for why the initial agreement failed. Firstly 
from the onset of negotiations, there was never a clear strategy regarding Mercosur. While trade 
negotiations with the block was a factor as well as promoting integration, there was no clear 
strategy for the block outside of trade. Among some high-level EU ministers Mercosur was 
never a clear priority. As one EU minister states,  
“The pyramid of privileges ran as follow (From top to bottom): the central and Eastern 
European countries, Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey; South-East European countries, the 
Cotonou Convention partners; the Euro-Mediterranean partners; other countries (the 
former Soviet republics, Latin American countries, ASEAN countries).”34 
 
During negotiations, which lasted from 1995 until 2004, the EU enlargements extended towards 
Eastern Europe, which presented much closer economic and security concerns. Overall, Latin 
America represented a region that had not grabbed the attention of the EU because it was not a 
security risk, nor did Latin America provide any real economic competition.35 Looking at trade 
between the EU and Latin America, one can see that this element in itself did not provide 
substantial incentive, in which to pursue a trade agreement. For example, between 1991 and 
1995, EU exports increased significantly to Mercosur; however, Mercosur only represented one 
percent of total EU exports.36 This means that during this era, the EU relied more heavily on 
trade from neighboring countries and that from an economic standpoint, there was not an 
incentive to increase ties with the region. Furthermore, as previously stated during negotiations, 
Mercosur representatives were the side that actively played a role in confronting the EU. This 
demonstrates how the EU did not view Mercosur as seriously as it did in its rhetoric.   
                                                 
34 Karen Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World: Third Edition (Polity Press, 2003), 120.  
 
35 Arantza Gomez Arana, The European UNION'S Policy towards MERCOSUR: Responsive Not Strategic 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 149. 
 
36 Ibid., 140.  
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Unfortunately, negotiators were unable to overcome the most challenging hurdle - the 
EU’s agricultural market. Even before negotiations began during the 1992 meeting between EU 
ministers and representatives of Mercosur, Mercosur representatives criticized the EU’s 
agricultural protectionism.37 Later as negotiations developed, after 1995, French, Irish and Dutch 
ministers of agriculture and fisheries, under pressure from their domestic lobbies, were opposed 
to this mandate.38 EU foreign ministers were able to convince the EU to pursue the liberalization 
of most sectors and agree to the creation of a free trade area within ten years under the EMIFCA, 
which followed WTO guidelines. However, Mercosur’s main agricultural products, which 
included cereals, meat, and dairy products, which comprised only 14 percent of trade between 
the two blocs, were deemed as sensitive products for the EU.39 In order to avoid the issue, EU 
ministers sought not to include agriculture in the agreement, yet Mercosur member states were 
vocal of their disagreement. Brazilian President Fernando Enrique Cardoso stated it would be 
tough to conclude an agreement with the EU because an agreement that did not include a chapter 
on agriculture would be nonsense.40 Both the EU and Mercosur member states were also bound 
by the WTO to support all sectors. For instance, Article XXIV of the WTO’s charter states that 
all free-trade agreements between its members must substantially cover all trade, which includes 
                                                 
37 Arantza Gomez Arana, The European UNION'S Policy towards MERCOSUR: Responsive Not Strategic (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2017), 126.  
 
38 Sebastian Santander , “The European Partnership with MERCOSUR: a Relationship Based on Strategic and 
Neoliberal Principles,” European Integration 27 (2005), 296.  
 
39 Arantza Gomez Arana, The European UNION'S Policy towards MERCOSUR: Responsive Not Strategic (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2017), 131.  
 
40 Ibid., 132.  
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a minimum of 90 percent of trade.41 This meant that from an international legal standpoint, the 
issue over agricultural products could not be ignored.  
In order to avoid the agricultural issue, EU ministers tied their agreement with Mercosur 
to WTO negotiations. This link to the WTO was proposed by the EU Commission in 1998 and 
then supported by France and other member states critical of the agreement in 1999. EU 
ministers agreed to wait until the end of the Doha round because agricultural subsidies would 
play a significant role in these talks. Following the Doha round in 2001, all WTO countries 
supported measures to decrease agricultural subsidies in favor of developing countries such as 
Brazil.42 This led to EU ministers proposing duty-free and preferential treatment covering more 
than 99 percent of imports of agricultural products from Mercosur.43 Despite this offer, some 
Mercosur states, such as Argentina, felt the offer did not go far enough. While the EU presidency 
in October 2004 was held by Portugal, EU ministers were unable to agree with Mercosur and 
failed to reach their ten-year deadline, as stated in the EMIFCA.   
As Brazilian ambassador to Brussels Jorio Dauster stated, “Globalization discourse is 
increasingly false and hypocritical. The rich countries are not globalizing because they are not 
opening their markets, especially to agriculture.”44 This statement describes a key element to the 
EU’s failure to secure this trade agreement – compromise. While agriculture only represented a 
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portion of overall trade, EU states were unwilling to open their highly protected markets. While 
some agricultural groups claimed that Mercosur member states did not uphold EU agricultural 
standards and pursued poor environmental policies,45 the WTO Doha round showed that 
agriculture remains a vital part of the economies of developing countries.  
As negotiations between the EU and Mercosur collapsed at the eleventh hour, the 
political makeup within Latin America changed. From 1999 until 2015, a rise in leftist leadership 
occurred across Latin America. Leaders such as President Lula da Silva championed increased 
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CHAPTER 3: EU-MERCOSUR 2004 TO THE PRESENT
Introduction 
Following the collapse of EU-Mercosur negotiations, the EU instead promoted bilateral 
association agreements in place of regional agreements. However, as this was going on, political 
dynamics within Latin America significantly changed after the turn of the twenty-first century. 
Gone were leaders that promoted the neo-liberal model and entered leaders that demanded 
increased social investments and a more substantial role of the government in society. Leaders of 
socialist parties won across the region, and these leaders changed relations between Latin 
America and the rest of the world for years to come. This, in turn, also changed the dynamics of 
the EU’s relationship with Mercosur.  
Section 3.1. Influence of the Pink Tide in Latin America and Mercosur   
The term “Pink Tide” was first linked to a statement made by New York Times reporter 
Larry Rohter covering the 2004 Uruguayan Presidential election. Rohter characterized the 
victory of Socialist party candidate Tabaré Vázquez, as “not so much a red tide but a pink 
one,”46 with red referring to the color of communism and pink referring to a diluted form 
associated to socialism. Across Latin America during the early 2000s, socialist party candidates 
began to win office on a wave of criticism over neo-liberal reforms and disagreement over the 
US as the hegemon in the region. Despite intense criticism over neo-liberalism, Mercosur and 
                                                 




other regional organizations were viewed by these leaders as a means to consolidate economic 
power.   
After the victory of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in 1998, this marked a left turn 
in Latin America. Chavez was followed by a wave of leftist politicians that emerged with the 
elections of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil and Nestor Kirchner of Argentina in 2003, 
Tabaré Vazquez of Uruguay in 2005, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, and Evo Morales of Bolivia in 
2006. These six leaders pursued policies under the alternative paradigm of neo-
developmentalism. As Matthias Ebenau states in his work, “Neo-developmentalism perceives 
today’s global economy as an arena of competition, not only between capitalist enterprises but 
also between nation-states, whose representatives seek to support their firms in order to derive 
maximum benefits for national development.”47 Under this system, the state assumes a 
significant role within society in order to accomplish its ‘national development’ objectives and to 
spur growth. By incentivizing key sectors, directing investment flows, exposing domestic firms 
to international competition, and by forming a coalition between the public and private sphere, 
states hope to increase economic growth thereby using national rent to promote social welfare 
goals.48  
While many leaders utilized this strategy differently, all leaders under the pink tide 
movement attempted to promote social welfare programs to raise people out of poverty, and this 
had some success. Without delving extensively into the social programs of all of these leaders, 
the most visible social welfare program born out of this initiative is the Bolsa Familia of Brazil. 
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The program represents the most extensive cash transfer program in the world, and through this 
and programs under its structure, nearly 30 million people in Brazil rose above the poverty 
line.49 Leaders within this movement also sought to promote state enterprises such as Brazil’s 
Petrobras and Venezuela’s PDVSA. Under the commodities boom of the 2000s, these industries 
flourished, and the success of these industries helped to fuel social welfare programs, which led 
to the formation of a middle class in Brazil. Nevertheless, while some leaders such as Chavez 
sought to use this strategy to pursue nationalistic policies and some such as Kirchner sought 
regressive tariff policies to promote fledging state industries, from a political angle Lula da Silva 
used this policy as a means to promote Mercosur and regional integration across Latin America.  
 Despite the promotion of state-owned firms as a means to promote national development, 
leaders within the pink tide movement sought to further Latin American integration, which in 
turn furthered Mercosur integration. While the government of the left shared a preoccupation 
with social justice, regional integration was furthered by a desire to seek greater autonomy from 
the United States.50 During this time, Brazil, under Lula da Silva emerged as one of the world’s 
leading economies. It found itself in league with the BRICS club with Russia, China, India, and 
South Africa. Under Lula de Silva, Brazil’s foreign policy objective in Latin America was the 
formation of a unified economic space grounded in free trade along with an Argentinian strategic 
alliance to revitalize Mercosur.51 Under Argentinian President Nestor Kirchner, this alliance was 
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confirmed and actively promoted. During the presidency of Lula da Silva, despite the failure of 
European and Mercosur nations to agree in 2004, Mercosur states made steps to further 
integration. For instance, that same year under Lula da Silva, Brazil signed an agreement 
between Mercosur and the Community of Andean nations to create a free economic zone. In 
2007, Mercosur nations established the Mercosur Parliament and included this institution within 
their framework. Moreover, in 2009 Mercosur states instituted freedom of movement of products 
and persons within the region, and this also included association states: Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Any citizen of a Mercosur member country can travel within these 
countries without the need for a visa.  
 However, while Mercosur did make strides to undergo further integration, despite the 
mutual ideological and economic movements connecting leaders within the Pink Tide, lack of 
interdependence along with an increased emphasis on other institutions plagued the growth of 
Mercosur. After 2000 several regional intuitions formed within South America, which included 
the Andean Community, The Pacific Alliance, The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our 
America (ALBA), and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean Nations (CELAC). In 
the case of the Pacific Alliance and the Andean Community, these groups often competed with 
Mercosur in the region.  
During this period, the Union of South American Nations, UNASUR, became the 
primary institution for leftist leaders within Latin America. Founded in 2008 in Brasília, 
UNASUR became a political arm for members within the Pink Tide movement to integrate 
regional policies within Latin America. Like with Mercosur, UNASUR was propelled under Lula 
da Silva as a means to integrate Latin America further. This integration and UNASUR’s status as 
a significant institution became most evident with the establishment of the Council of South 
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American Defense under UNASUR, whereby members of UNASUR sought a common defense 
policy and actively supported the exchange of armed forces.52 Also, under UNASUR, the 
Commission of Planning (COSIPLAN) was given 161.4 billion dollars to construct 580 
infrastructure projects within Latin America.  
Nevertheless, UNASUR, and its initiatives, later fell apart due to the depreciating 
economies of many of its members and disagreement with Venezuela over its human rights 
record. UNASUR members established a ‘Democratic Clause’ within their constitution to 
prevent states with issues of human rights from taking part in the institution. This clause was 
initiated in 2014 after current Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was elected under 
questionable circumstances, and riots ensued throughout the country. Despite never officially 
suspending Venezuela, six of UNASUR’s founding members, which included Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru joined the Lima Group and officially renounced the 
organization in 2018. Furthermore, organizational mismanagement was evident in UNASUR. 
Out of the funds issued to construct infrastructure projects under COSIPLAN, only 158 out of 
580 construction projects were completed, which corresponded to 12 percent of their actual 
value.53  
Primarily the driving force behind the expansion of the social welfare policies was 
commodities boom of the 2000s. While this caused Latin American markets to grow, ultimately, 
Latin American economies, particularly Mercosur members, became extremely dependent on 
their commodities exports and their clients. According to data from the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean, between 2003 and 2012, the region grew an average rate of 
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4% per year even after the global financial crisis of 2008.54 However, this growth was almost 
entirely centered around commodities exports, and this dependency continued. Between 2000 
and 2011, commodities exports of Latin America grew from 40% to 60% of total exports.55 
Prices and quantity of exports such as petroleum, minerals such as copper, gold, iron ore grew, 
and agricultural products such as soy and wheat increased throughout this period.56 In the case of 
the two largest economies in Mercosur, Brazil and Argentina benefited significantly from this 
boom. For Brazil, its state-owned petroleum firm, Petrobras, expanded its activities and became 
a global leader in biofuels production. Brazil also became a global leader in the world’s soy 
market.57 As for Argentina, the country also became a leader in soy as well as derivatives (oil 
and flour) and biofuels.58 The growth in these industries for both Brazil and Argentina can be 
measured within their overall GDP.  In Brazil, the ratio between agricultural and mining GDP 
increased from just over 50% to almost 60% from 2003 to 2012 and in Argentina from just over 
40% to almost 80% from 2002 to 2010, declining to more than 65% in 2012.59 However, while 
Brazil and Argentina, as well as many other Latin American nations, were able to maintain high 
levels of growth through their commodities, this growth eventually dissipated. For example, 
                                                 
 
54 Ibid., 12.  
55 Armado Cervo , “Latin America's Slow Pace in the Twenty First Century ,” AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of 
Strategy & International Relations, 2016, 13.  
 
56 Ibid., 13. 
 
57 Sergio Ordóñez and Carlos Sánchez, “Latin American ‘Neo-Developmentalism,’ State Action and Supranational 
Realignment: What Consequences to Multipolarity?,” World Review of Political Economy 8, no. 3 (2017), 378.  
 
58 Ibid., 380.  
 
59 Ibid., 374.  
 
 25 
according to data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, after Brazil registered 
a maximum growth of 7.5 percent in 2010 by 2015, the country experienced negative GDP 
growth of -3.8 percent.60 This demand for commodities after the 2008 crisis became entirely 
supported by China, and after the turn of the decade, China asserted its authority over the 
continent.  
Section 3.2. The Rise of Chinese involvement in Latin America and Mercosur  
After the 2008 financial crisis, China played a significantly more substantial role in Latin 
America and was the driving force behind maintaining the commodities boom. China has 
transformed itself as a crucial destination for resources from Latin America and has achieved the 
role of the primary or secondary trade partner position for many countries within the region. This 
represents a challenge to both US and European influence in the Americas. China’s growth can 
be documented from both a Latin American and Mercosur perspective.  
In terms of Latin America, in 2000, less than one percent of Latin American exports were 
sent to China, but by 2010 nearly 10 percent of all Latin American exports were sent to China.61 
By 2020 China is expected to pass the European Union in both Latin American imports and 
exports, accounting for 16.2 percent of the region’s imports and the destination of nearly 20 
percent of the region’s exports.62  
In terms of Mercosur member states, China’s investment was supported as a means to 
diversify trade away from the United States. In a speech that Lula da Silva gave on a visit to 
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Shanghai, Lula da Silva believed that trade with China would cause Brazil to move away from 
trading commodities.63 While Lula hoped to promote manufacturing firms such as Embraer, 
Brazil’s relationship with China would be focused primarily on commodities exports and the 
importation of Chinese manufactured goods. During an interview in 2011, former Brazilian 
President Dilma Rousseff criticized Brazil’s relationship with China stating, “We need to move 
beyond a complementary relationship in favor of a more dynamic, more diversified, and more 
equal relationship.”64 Despite this rhetoric, Brazil and other Mercosur members continued to 
focus on commodities exports. By 2014 China became Brazil’s number one export partner as the 
country sent 42.6 percent of its total exports to China, an equivalent of 40.6 billion dollars. 
Furthermore, China has also become one of the primary sources of foreign direct 
investment in both Brazil and Argentina by most noticeably financing large-scale infrastructure 
projects.65 China’s role in infrastructure projects follows a global strategy. As Farah and Benning 
state in their article Extra-Regional Actors in Latin America,  
“(China) is seeking to leverage its growing economic weight and capabilities, through a 
combination of statecraft, trade, loans, investment, and other forms of engagement, to 
structure a world order in which global commercial flows, political relationships, and 
institutions support expanding China’s wealth and power.”66  
 
China’s global strategy follows its Belt and Road Initiative. By playing a dynamic role within 
Latin America economies, China aims to promote its economic ambitions while also influencing 
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the politics within these countries. China’s intentions were affirmed during a visit by former 
Argentinian president Mauricio Macri to Beijing in May 2017  in which Chinese President Xi 
Jinping stated, “Latin America is the natural extension of the 21st century Maritime Silk Road.”67 
Officially 17 out of 31 Latin American nations, have agreed to join China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative.68 Furthermore, as part of this policy, China has launched 23 major infrastructure 
projects and owns controlling interests in 56 ports across Latin America and the Caribbean.69  
 While many countries may view Chinese investments as a means to boost economic 
development, under belt and road initiatives, China routinely prioritizes the national security 
interests over the objective of mutually beneficial economic development, contradicting the 
position of official policy documents.70 China's influence over its partners can also be seen in its 
support of military training. For example, in 2015, China, for the first time, trained more Latin 
American military officers than the United States, and the difference has continued to grow ever 
since.71 Focus on political and economic relations with Latin American and Mercosur nations 
has proven successful as China has not only become the leading trading partner for Argentina, 
but the country is also for Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.72 China’s increasing role in Latin 
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America has become more evident to European leaders. While renegotiations of the EU-
Mercosur treaty began in 2010, China’s rising influence in Latin America has become a driving 
force in maintaining talks.  
Section 3.3. Return of EU-Mercosur discussions  
Officially the European Union did not consider that talks with Mercosur had terminated; 
however, between 2004 and 2010, there was little communication between both organizations. 
During this period, the EU focused primarily on bilateral trade negotiations. For instance, the 
European Union signed several bilateral agreements with Brazil (2007), Mexico (2008), and 
Chile (2009).73 Negotiations between the two blocs resumed once Spain assumed the EU 
presidency in 2010. Spain’s desire to further discussions with Mercosur represented the influence 
of Iberian states. However, the total economic potential for an agreement provided an intriguing 
opportunity.  
 The potential of an EU-Mercosur agreement would provide substantial economic 
advantages. With a combined population of more than 700 million people and a combined GDP 
with bi-regional trade close to 100 billion euros annually, cooperation between the two blocs 
would generate reciprocal advantages and positive spillovers at the global level.74 Furthermore, 
in terms of trade, the European Union remained a key trading partner of Latin America. In 2012 
nearly 17 percent of the trade from all Mercosur members involved the European Union.75 This 
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was also coupled with the United States’ desire to negotiate both the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) as well as the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Mercosur under 
these circumstances felt isolated, and this led most Mercosur states to pursue an EU-Mercosur 
agreement. Furthermore, the increasing focus on the Asia-Pacific region, the international 
economic crisis, and the rise of right-wing governments across the EU left a desire for the EU to 
assert greater authority in the world.  
 However, disparities between the two trading blocs have become more evident over the 
years. In terms of trade in 2007, the Mercosur region only generated a GDP of 1.6 quadrillion 
dollars while the EU generated 12.3 quadrillion euros.76 In addition, the same problems with the 
agreement remained. The issue regarding agricultural trade continued to cause many EU 
members to oppose the agreement. By 2004 there were only 14 members in the EU, but by 2010 
the EU had grown to 28 member states with many of these new members relying on agricultural 
exports within the EU.77 When the European Commission announced that negotiations had 
resumed in May 2010, the agricultural ministers of fourteen member states Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, and Slovakia announced their intentions to kill the initiative.78 However, despite an 
increased dislike for the proposed agreement, leaders within the EU, as well as key EU member 
states supported the measure. For example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel was an active 
supporter of the agreement.  
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 On the Mercosur side, Brazil and Uruguay actively sought to formalize the agreement. 
Brazilian Presidents Lula da Silva and later Rousseff believed that Brazil needed to improve the 
competitiveness of its exports.79 However, just as in previous negotiations, Argentina proved 
difficult. Under the administrations of both Nestor Kirchner and later Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner, Argentina sought to increase tariffs on imports as a means to follow neo-
developmentalist policies.80 Even after negotiations had restarted, representatives of Fernández 
de Kirchner’s administration did not allow more than 80 percent of EU products to be subject to 
customs tariffs. While European leaders, including Angela Merkel, offered to allow Mercosur 
negotiations to follow a two-speed rule in 2015 whereby Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay 
negotiated and wait for Argentinian ministers to follow, both European and Mercosur members 
were likely not to continue.  
 Furthermore, Mercosur itself became unstable. In 2012, Mercosur member states 
suspended Paraguay on charges of the parliament carrying out a political coup by impeaching 
then-president Fernando Lugo. Following Paraguay’s suspension, Mercosur members voted to 
include Venezuela into Mercosur. While Mercosur later allowed Paraguay to re-enter the trading 
bloc, Venezuela was later suspended in 2017 due to increasing human rights abuses under 
President Maduro’s government.  
 Nevertheless, political events later led both parties back to the table. In 2015 Argentinean 
pro-business candidate Mauricio Macri changed the country’s protectionist stance in favor of 
trade liberalization and prioritized negotiations with the EU.81 After Macri’s victory, not only did 
                                                 
79 Arantza Gomez Arana, The European UNION'S Policy towards MERCOSUR: Responsive Not Strategic 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 193.  
 




meetings between the EU and Mercosur become more productive, but also the frequency of 
meetings increased.82 In terms of the EU, the election of US President Donald Trump in 2016 led 
to the end of the highly anticipated TTIP. The British referendum to exit the EU along with the 
rise of populist leaders throughout Europe critical of EU gave EU leaders a new impetus to 
conclude negotiations. These unfavorable dynamics forced the EU to pursue new trade deals 
around the world to defend global trade liberalization. In addition, the election of Brazilian 
President Jair Bolsonaro proved to be a factor that stimulated negotiations. While academics 
viewed the election of Bolsonaro as the death sentence of the agreement as Bolsonaro actively 
stated that Mercosur would not be a priority of his administration, it was Brazilian trade 
negotiators under Bolsonaro’s government that made the agreement a priority.83 The culmination 
of these events allowed for EU and Mercosur negotiators to finally agree after over twenty years. 
On June 28, 2019, representatives of both blocs announced that the agreement had been signed.  
Section 3.4. An Unsteady Arrangement  
Presently there still exist several barriers until the agreement can be ratified. All twenty-
seven individual EU member state parliaments must ratify the agreement while the four national 
parliaments of Mercosur must also confirm the agreement. Moreover, agricultural lobbyists and 
interest groups, including the Union of European farmers and the agricultural lobbying group, 
COPE-COGECA, have voiced their intention of destroying the agreement.  
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Also, the agreement was founded on the hope that Argentinian President Mauricio Macri 
would win a second term. Whereas in the past Argentina had prevented the EU-Mercosur 
agreement in 2004, Macri’s presence and pro-business policies served as a steady hand during 
EU-Mercosur negotiations and presented Argentina as a proponent of the EU-Mercosur 
agreement. His loss to Peronist candidate Alberto Fernandez supported by running mate 
Fernandez de Kirchner means that Argentina may return to protectionists policies. Nonetheless, 
the key to coming to an agreement over this trade deal is for both sides to seek to comprise. 
Under this trade agreement, the European Union is likely to make economic gains in areas such 
as automobiles and car parts, chemicals, machinery, textiles, and improved market access for 
wine and cheese, all of which are essential industries for Europe.84 As for Mercosur, Brazil, and 
Argentina, all desire increased trade in order to improve economic growth.  
However, this time the European Union is competing in a truly multi-polar world, and if 
the EU does not take steps to further its trade with Latin America, China will cement its 
dominance over the EU. Within this highly competitive environment, it is therefore essential that 
leaders search for a compromise towards inter-regionalism. In order to define this compromise, 
the goals of leaders within the European Union must be addressed. Their goals in an increasing 
anti-multilateral world will highlight the need for Europe to be involved in the global economy 
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CHAPTER 4: THE GOALS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Introduction 
Throughout negotiations between the European Union and Mercosur, the aspirations of 
the EU have dramatically changed. At this time the EU no longer resembles a sturdy multi-
national organization, but rather an organization facing multiple threats from the departure of the 
UK and the threat of other member states leaving the EU; the desires of populist leaders to 
abandon multilateralism, and China continuing to assert itself on the world stage. Under these 
circumstances, the EU not only needs to play a more dynamic role in foreign policy, but more 
importantly, the EU needs a foreign policy victory to promote multilateralism. In order to 
accomplish this, the EU must support international agreements, including the EU-Mercosur 
agreement to fulfill its goal of supporting interregionalism.  
Section 4.1. Promotion of Interregionalism 
Historically EU leaders have considered an interregional agreement as a means to 
promote multinationalism and thus promote the EU’s foreign policy agendas. The promotion of 
the EU’s model represents another form of power projection. While power traditionally is 
considered as a coercive ability for A to force B to do what A desires,85 power is also the ability 
to influence outcomes and agendas through persuasion.86 Through ‘soft power’ dynamics, states 
can create behavioral changes and attract partners. ‘Normative power’ provides the opportunity 
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for democracies to spread their values and their conceptions of human rights.87 From a normative 
power perspective, the EU seeks to reshape the world according to its values and norms. This 
process of re-shaping the world is why the EU can also be considered as a ‘transformative 
power.’88 
Inter-regionalism is viewed as a vehicle to gain international acceptance of the EU’s 
model of integration.89 As Maria Garcia states in her work, “If the EU is perceived as a 
successful model of economic and political integration and is emulate d by others, its internal 
legitimacy is enhanced, and its discourses are validated.”90 By formulating economic agreements 
and by providing access to the EU’s market, the EU can use these agreements as a means to 
become a ‘transformative power.’  
In the case of Mercosur, by promoting regional integration elsewhere connected to the 
EU,  this strategy coincides with the EU’s hopes for greater multilateral cooperation, which 
could be achieved with more integrated regional blocs. Beneficial trade is of course a vital aspect 
of this agreement. While trade between the EU and Mercosur is asymmetric with less than 5 
percent of all the EU’s imports coming from the South American organization, EU trade to 
Mercosur still represents nearly 20 percent of Mercosur’s imports.91 Also, 39 percent of all 
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investments in Mercosur comes from the EU.92 Investments from Spanish as well as German 
banks constitute a sizeable portion of Mercosur’s economy, and therefore the EU does have 
much to gain by furthering trade relations.  
 By supporting regional integration, this furthers the narrative that regional integration 
promotes democracy. The EU views Mercosur as a means to stabilize democracy in the region. 
The election of right-leaning candidates and their desire to promote Mercosur relations 
strengthens this argument because under new political leadership, integration has increased. With 
the elections of both Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and former Argentinian President 
Mauricio Macri, Mercosur meetings have accelerated between members. Tariffs between all 
members regarding key sectors have gradually fallen.93 In the most recent meeting between 
Mercosur member states, trade negotiators spoke of the desire to use the organization as an 
“accelerator towards more integrated markets.”94 This suggests that Mercosur is not an 
organization committed to leaders of the left, but rather an organization that can serve to promote 
integration regardless of political affiliation. Nonetheless, recent political events have placed 
greater emphasis on EU-Mercosur relations.  
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Section 4.2. Acceleration of EU Goals After 2016 
Political events in the latter half of the previous decade have caused the European Union 
to accelerate its goals in response and to confront geopolitical issues. Before the past decade, 
European enlargement moved in a positive trajectory with a clear focus towards the east. While 
many scholars believed that the logical step was for Turkey and possibly Ukraine to join the 
European Union, political events have led to different outcomes. Russia’s gradual escalation 
against former members of the Soviet Union, such as with Georgia in 2008 and later with 
Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, demonstrate increased hostilities. The British 
referendum to leave the EU, the decision by US President Donald Trump to abandon multilateral 
alliances and agreements including the TTIP and the rise of China have signaled that the EU 
cannot take a passive role in geopolitical developments. The EU must be proactive- not reactive- 
if it hopes to accomplish its foreign policy goals.  
The culmination of these events has ultimately led to a greater focus on geopolitics within 
the EU and the formation of a Geopolitical Commission by recently elected European 
Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen. The decision by the Commission President to 
make EU foreign policy take a more active role represents how the EU intends to accelerate its 
goals with a keen eye on current and future geopolitical issues. This also means that Europe’s 
decisions cannot be entirely for the benefit of its markets. If the EU wishes to engage in 
diplomacy through its efforts, then pragmatism and compromise are required. This exact 
pragmatism and compromise are also needed with the EU-MERCOSUR agreement.  
 When the Commission President announced her plan for the creation of a Geopolitical 
Commission, the concept seemed counter to the visions of European Union thinkers such as Jean 
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Monnet and Robert Schauman, which viewed European integration as a means to overcome 
power politics.95 However, the gradual deterioration of multinationalism in the world has left the 
EU no choice but to go on the offensive. Leaders such as Emmanuel Macron applauded the 
decision, particularly the EU Commission President’s comments on the need for the EU to be a 
‘Guardian of multilateralism’ and ‘to protect the European way of life.96 Von der Leyen’s plan is 
to increase spending in areas of defense and aid while furthering trade agreements and promoting 
the ascensions of EU allies in the Balkans.97 In terms of trade, the EU views continuing trade 
agreements with an eye towards the geopolitical significance of overcoming both US and 
Chinese aggression. By finalizing free trade agreements with states regional organizations that 
will respect multilateral institutions such as Canada, Vietnam, Japan, and now Mercosur, the EU 
sees these states as partners that will support their views.  
 Furthermore, the continuation of finalizing agreements with other states despite the 
impact it may have on specific sectors, namely agriculture, is evident even after the EU-
Mercosur agreement was signed. With the EU-Mercosur agreement finalized in June 2019 along 
with the recent approval of the EU-Mexico trade deal in April 2020, EU leaders are acutely 
aware that these trade agreements could harm specific sectors of its agricultural market. After the 
signing of the recent EU-Mexico trade agreement, French farmers and agricultural groups, just as 
with the EU-Mercosur trade agreement, were livid and believed the agreement would open the 
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doors to 20000 tons of Mexican beef banned in the EU due to health concerns.98 However, 
almost all industrial sectors, as well as some agriculture goods, are likely to benefit from this 
trade agreement, just as with the EU-Mercosur agreement. The EU will be forced to make a 
decision, the maintenance of an extremely protected agricultural sector, or the promotion of its 
geopolitical goals. In light of political events in the latter half of the previous decade, the 
European Union appears more inclined to compromise its agricultural sector in exchange for 
recruiting future allies.   
Increased threats from China and Russia, along with the absence of US leadership, mean 
that if the European Union desires to accomplish its goals, then ultimately the EU must play a 
more significant role within the international order. The acceleration of its goals by initiating a 
geopolitical commission and by finalizing trade agreements with other states and regional blocs 
illustrates that the EU is concerned with its place in the world. The EU-Mercosur agreement 
represents not only a foreign policy objective for the EU but, more importantly, an opportunity to 
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CHAPTER 5: THE DESIRES OF KEY EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES 
Introduction 
In order to understand the EU-Mercosur agreement, the desires of leaders within key 
member states within the European Union must also be assessed. In this case, the promotion of 
the European Union’s model of multilateralism as well as free-markets, are not the only concern 
for these leaders. These leaders must also balance the economic goals of their states while 
focusing on their electoral survival. This thesis will examine the positions of Germany’s 
Chancellor, Angela Merkel, as well as France’s President, Emmanuel Macron in order to gauge 
the perspectives of individual European leaders and critical European member states.  
Both Macron and Merkel represent the defining leaders of the European Union currently. 
Not only do Germany and France’s economies dominate the European single market, but more 
importantly, these leaders are aware of their elevated profiles now that the United Kingdom is no 
longer a member. Merkel, throughout her tenure, supported maintaining negotiations with 
Mercosur members. Macron, along with France, has actively voiced disagreement with the 
arrangement due to France’s substantial agricultural market and has led the calls from 
Agricultural ministers to reject the agreement. Nevertheless, both leaders view the EU-Mercosur 
agreement as necessary for the EU to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Thus, both leaders 
understand the need to compromise the EU’s protectionist agricultural sector in order to achieve 





Section 5.1. Macron’s electoral optics and France’s relationship with Brazil 
Historically France has opposed the EU-Mercosur agreement because Mercosur member 
states Brazil and Argentina would flood European markets with cheap agricultural products such 
as meat. However, when the agreement was first announced, Macron championed the decision as 
a success claiming, “A trade deal is not bad in itself.”99 Macron also strongly warned against 
protectionist attitudes stating, “We are not protectionists…those that say the trade agreement is 
bad, tell me in such cases how they will dress, eat, and move.”100 Gradually, Macron’s language 
has changed to be more critical of the trade agreement for several reasons related to his electoral 
survival.  
Despite Macron’s vision for a stronger, more independent Europe, the French President’s 
political livelihood is determined by his need to maintain a strong coalition of his supporters. 
Macron is not concerned with farm lobbyists but instead appeasing far-left Green party voters by 
taking a strong stance towards environmental protections. Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s 
populist approval and complete disregard for environmental policies or multilateralism contradict 
Macron’s environmentalist and multi-national En Marche movement. After wildfires in 2019 
burned over 60000 square-kilometers of Amazon rain forest,101 Macron claimed that Bolsonaro 
had lied about its willingness to pursue international environmental standards and would seek to 
vote down the EU-Mercosur agreement in France’s parliament.102 While Bolsonaro later sent 
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security forces to put down the wildfires, Macron has insisted that unless Brazil follows the Paris 
Climate Accord, France will not back the EU-Mercosur agreement.103 Under these 
circumstances, Macron appears unwilling to approve of the agreement.  
 Macron’s issue with the EU-Mercosur agreement is not guided by farming unions, but 
rather the need to show his left-leaning supporters that his movement stands for environmental 
justice. As late as November 2019, farmers within France were protesting against Macron’s 
decision to ban the use of certain pesticides with farming unions claiming that the president had 
forgotten them.104 Despite France historically appearing as the champion of maintaining 
Europe’s agricultural markets, Macron’s stance would suggest otherwise. Furthermore, French 
firms such as Renault and BASF stand to gain from decreased tariffs to Mercosur markets. In 
principle, France would make economic gains from its arrangement with Mercosur, and the EU’s 
economic influence would expand. In order for the EU to achieve its foreign policy ambitions, 
and to improve French economic growth, a compromise in terms of lowering protective barriers 
towards France and Europe’s agricultural markets is necessary in order to promote overall 
economic growth and to accomplish Europe’s foreign policy goals.  
Since Macron’s election, the French President views an increased role not only for France 
within the EU but also for the EU to expand its presence globally. With the United Kingdom’s 
removal from the EU and the withdrawal of US support for Europe under President Trump, 
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Macron considers the US and its foreign policy structure to be ‘brain dead’105 and believes in a 
more robust EU foreign policy which shows why Macron approved of von der Leyen’s decision 
to create a Geopolitical commission. Despite political and economic developments from 
COVID-19, Macron stated in a recent interview that it is essential to emphasize the 
interdependence that the nations of the world share in a globalized system.106 While Covid-19 
may cause the nations of the world to become more entrenched, reaction to this virus might be 
the opposite. As Macron stated, “Isolationist policies proposed by populist leaders do not work 
an inter-connected world.”107 The spread of a virus across the world has further created the need 
for support of multilateralism. The EU cannot hope to spread its values if this organization only 
acts within Europe. The organization must take a proactive approach and become involved in 
international markets.  
Section 5.2. Merkel and the EU-Mercosur Agreement 
Historically Angela Merkel and Germany have supported the EU-Mercosur project. 
Merkel’s support of the agreement is led by a belief that the EU must confront China in Latin 
America, and that Germany must make compromises towards its Agricultural sector in order for 
the European Union to succeed in its economic goals and within its foreign policy agenda.  
After negotiations between the EU and Mercosur began to restart in 2011, Merkel was 
vocal of Germany’s support for the association agreement between the two blocs claiming the 
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agreement was beneficial for Europe.108 This support continued throughout the decade. Despite 
the mercurial political situation of Mercosur during the 2010s with Venezuelan membership and 
suspension along with the impeachment of former Brazilian president Dilma Rouseff, Merkel 
remained not only supportive of the agreement but also pursued individual trade relations 
between the EU and Brazil and Argentina during this period. This was reflected before the G20 
summit in 2017 in which Merkel traveled to both Mexico and Argentina to pursue trade relations 
with these two countries. During re-negotiations of the EU-Mercosur trade agreement in 2017, 
Merkel plainly stated, "Negotiating a free trade agreement is always a difficult matter. And, 
Germany is not always an easy partner but if there is a will to sign the agreement then we must 
also make compromises.”109 Merkel then went on to say that German agricultural interest groups 
did not align with the country’s interests and that she supported an agreement with Argentina and 
Mercosur.110 From an economic perspective, Germany is likely to gain immensely from this 
agreement. After all, because the EU’s main export products to Mercosur member states include 
car parts, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals, German firms such as Volkswagen and Bayer are 
likely to benefit tremendously from decreased tariffs. However, from a geopolitical perspective, 
the agreement represents a victory for the EU in support of multilateralism and a counter to 
China’s gradual encroachment in Latin America.  
 According to analysts at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, a German think-tank 
associated with Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union Party, the rise of Chinese 
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investments challenges the Western model of order. It presents itself as a competitor to the EU in 
Latin America.111 However, if fully ratified trade between the EU and Mercosur would be eight 
times that of the EU’s trade with Canada and four times the trade generated from the EU’s 
largest agreement, which is with Japan.112 The EU’s market position would undoubtedly be 
strengthened with the agreement. Through its markets, the EU could promote its values of 
multilateralism and support of Mercosur as a legitimate regional institution in Latin America.  
 German foreign ministers, as well as German representatives to the EU, are united in 
support of the EU-Mercosur agreement as a means to promote multilateralism. The German 
foreign office has also sought to form bilateral diplomatic ties with many states with Mercosur 
member states such as Argentina and Brazil.113 German ministers through international 
organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union have also increased 
Germany’s prescience on issues related to Latin America and have used these forums to promote 
multilateralism and free trade. For instance, as a member of the UN Security Council in 2019 
Germany spear-headed the Alliance for Multilateralism initiative for like-minded UN member 
states to come together to support resolutions in favor of multilateralism around the world, and 
most recently has led initiatives to increase UN aid to Latin American NGOs working to support 
refugees from Venezuela to 50 million euros.114 Germany’s support for increased free trade 
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agreements and the EU-Mercosur agreement is most evident statements made by representatives 
for Germany to the EU Council. From 1 July 2020 until the end of this year, Germany will 
assume the EU Presidency and its representatives intend to pass resolutions that approve of 
“open, ambitious, and fair trade policy and strengthen the rules of multilateralism.”115 Not only 
do German representatives plan to push the EU-Mercosur agreement, but also German 
representatives plan to work towards a second TTIP with the United States and to finalize 
bilateral agreements with Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand.116 Despite criticism from EU 
Green party ministers that Brazil under Bolsonaro is not adhering to the Paris Climate accords 
and the rejection of the EU-Mercosur agreement by Austria and Dutch national parliaments, 
German ministers believe that the deal can still be passed.117  
The persistence of Merkel, as well as German ministers, illustrates how Germany 
believes that this agreement is vital for the future of the European Union as well as its economic 
interests. Angela Merkel, members of the German government, and German representatives to 
the EU believe the EU must project power abroad in order to remain relevant, and therefore 
using the European Union’s market power is essential in achieving its foreign policy objectives. 
In order to achieve the EU-Mercosur agreement, Germany and other EU members must move 
against protectionists sectors within the EU.  
Both Merkel and Macron recognize that their leadership represents the foundation of the 
European Union. With the removal of the United Kingdom, the decisions made by Macron and 
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Merkel will determine the future of the EU. Thus, French and German unity will be needed to 
























CHAPTER 6: BOLSONARO’S ATTEMPTS AT ECONOMIC GROWTH
Introduction 
The other side to the EU-Mercosur agreement rests in the hands of Mercosur member 
states. Unlike the EU, Mercosur is not nearly as organized and nor is the bloc made of relatively 
equal members. After 2000, Brazil has emerged as the economic and political leader of Mercosur 
and has maintained this leadership throughout the turn of the century. While Argentina carries a 
substantial portion of economic and political weight within the Southern Common Market, 
Brazil’s economy dominates the region and the South American continent. As of 2018, Brazil 
generated a GDP of four times that of Argentina and has a population roughly five times the size 
of Argentina’s. Thus Mercosur is by extension a reflection of Brazil’s economic and foreign 
policy achievements.  
 Following the emergence of the Car Wash Scandal in 2014, which led to the 
impeachment of former president Dilma Rousseff in 2016, vice president Michael Temer was 
sworn in as President of Brazil and finished Rousseff’s term. Temer’s time as president of Brazil 
led to a shift in relations in the promotion of relations between Brazil and the European Union.118 
After frequent setbacks with the EU-Mercosur agreement, the Temer administration sought to 
formalize a strategic partnership with the EU and set the stage for individual trade negotiations 
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between Brazil and the EU and possibly the US.119 Temer’s decision marked a change from 
Lula’s focus on South-South cooperation and an autonomous Mercosur, to a re-orientation of 
Brazil’s foreign policy to the west.120  
Temer’s actions eventually set the framework for the pro-business agenda pursued by 
right-leaning parties in Brazil. With the unemployment rate in Brazil reaching 12.5 percent by 
2018 and increasing investigations connected to the Car Wash Scandal, Bolsonaro was elected 
on a wave of populist disgust for mainstream politics.121 Bolsonaro campaigned on a pro-
business agenda seeking to undo the bureaucratic red tape and environmental regulations, which 
he believed were holding back Brazil’s economy.122 Bolsonaro also campaigned on the idea of 
Brazil leaving Mercosur and not abiding by multilateral environmental agreements.123 However, 
this leads to a dilemma. In order to support free-market policies and spur Brazilian business, this 
means that Bolsonaro must support free-trade agreements. While Bolsonaro abhors the 
international community, he also believes that in order to improve economic growth, Brazil must 
sign free-trade agreements. At the same time, Bolsonaro has also heavily criticized Brazil’s 
dependence on Chinese trade and investments. By finalizing the EU-Mercosur agreement and by 
attempting to sign additional bilateral free-trade agreements with the US, Canada, and other 
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countries, this helps to diversify trade away from China and curb China’s influence. Thus, the 
EU-Mercosur agreement represents the opportunity for Bolsonaro to legitimize his strategies by 
compromising his beliefs.  
Section 6.1. Bolsonaro’s free-trade desire  
President Jair Bolsonaro was elected on a wave of populist sentiment against corruption 
from politicians of established parties. While Bolsonaro has portrayed himself as a radical 
working against Marxists, feminists, and environmentalist NGOs in Brazil, the heart of his 
economic goals are to improve Brazil’s economy by promoting market-oriented neoliberal 
policies. This represented a radical shift from the protectionism of the Workers Party. However, 
this change was supported by a broad coalition of supporters from wealthy business groups such 
as the Federation for São Paulo State Industries (FIESP) as well as middle-class voters who have 
experienced a steady rise in unemployment since 2014 coupled with a substantial increase in 
violent crime.  
There is market data as well as a growing literature to suggest that in general, the 
protectionist trade policies maintained under the leftist governments of Lula da Silva and 
Rousseff have worsened Brazilian unemployment and that trade liberalization is needed. Sonia 
Araujo and Dorthee Flaig in their article, Trade Restrictions in Brazil: Who Pays the Price? find 
that over the past twenty years trade policy regarding import tariffs and the implementation of 
local content requirements (LCR) in manufacturing sectors has virtually remained the same. 
While these high tariffs and LCRs are used to protect Brazilian domestic firms, Araujo and Flaig 
argue, “import tariffs and LCRs reduce the incentives to raise efficiency and invest in innovation 
to increase quality or differentiation.”124 Furthermore, through quantitative analysis, Araujo and 
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Flaig find that by promoting trade liberalization policies such as decreasing tariffs, LCRs, and 
lowering indirect taxes levied on exports by Brazilian firms, trade liberalization increases 
production and decreases domestic prices.125 Under these circumstances labor demand increases 
with the highest number of jobs being awarded to unskilled workers.126 Thus, there is data and 
empirical analysis to support the underlying principle that market-friendly policies are needed in 
order to increase employment levels.  
Bolsonaro’s minister of economics, Paulo Guedes, represents a stark contrast to the 
policies implemented by Brazil’s leftist governments of the past. A graduate of the University of 
Chicago’s Economics department under the tutelage of Milton Freidman, Guedes believes that 
liberal economic policies such as spending cuts, lowering regulations, simplifying the country’s 
tax system and privatizing many of Brazil’s overburdened state-owned firms such as 
Petrobras.127 In October 2019, the government was able to reform the decade's old pension 
system by raising the retirement age to 65, which marks ten years higher than the current 
national average of 55 according to the OECD.128 While the pension reform bill is not by any 
means perfect and does not even consider the country’s military which consistently retires before 
the national average, the passing of the bill was seen by many as a victory for Bolsonaro’s liberal 
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economic policies. The proposed EU-Mercosur agreement follows Bolsonaro’s ambitions for 
liberalizing Brazil’s economy.  
Following the signing of the EU-Mercosur agreement, Bolsonaro stated that the 
agreement could be used to leverage additional free-trade agreements and create a domino 
effect.129 Bolsonaro and his economic ministers have stated that Brazil wishes to lower 
international tariffs by increasing the number of FTAs, whether through Mercosur, through 
bilateral negotiations or new organizations.130 The Brazilian president has heavily lobbied for 
membership into the OECD, which the president and his allies believe will improve Brazil’s 
economy and was able to receive approval from the US for entry into the OECD in January 
2020. Thus creating new FTAs represents a vital part of Bolsonaro’s economic policy. While 
Brazil’s current environmental record and Bolsonaro’s opinion towards the environment have 
sounded alarms over the future of the EU-Mercosur agreement, it must be noted that Bolsonaro’s 
economic reforms rely on the approval of the international community in order to create 
additional FTAs or to join international organizations like the OECD. Therefore, despite 
Bolsonaro’s rhetoric towards the environment or disagreements with the EU and its members, 
the Brazilian president needs to accelerate the growth of Brazil’s economy in order to legitimize 
his pro-business strategies, which are a complete divergence from his predecessors Rousseff and 
Lula da Silva. In order to achieve this growth, Bolsonaro understands Brazil must strike free 
trade agreements with other nations and trading blocs, and the EU-Mercosur trade agreement 
represents the country’s best option. Therefore, Bolsonaro must compromise his stance towards 
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the European Union and international organizations like Mercosur in order to improve the 
economic situation in Brazil.  
Section 6.2. Diversifying trade away from China   
While campaigning, Bolsonaro’s stance towards China also reflected a divergence from 
his predecessors. As Lula da Silva and Rousseff sought to cultivate relations with China as part 
of South-South dynamics, Bolsonaro heavily criticized China’s increasing presence in Brazil. 
Most famously while campaigning in 2018, Bolsonaro stated, “The Chinese are not buying in 
Brazil. They are buying Brazil.”131 Bolsonaro’s views on China have been described as 
combative by Chinese diplomats as he was the first Brazilian presidential candidate ever to visit 
Taiwan since Brazil recognized Beijing’s One China Policy in the 1970s.132 Bolsonaro views 
China’s control of energy infrastructure and telecommunications industries in Brazil as a threat 
and has stated that state-owned firms would seek not to sell their assets to China.133  
While elements of Bolsonaro’s far-right supporters are fueling distrust of China, it is vital 
to keep in mind that the Brazilian leader is walking a tight rope. Brazil has significantly 
benefited from the US-China trade war and has gained substantial business, especially in 
agriculture sectors such as soy. However, over-reliance on China has led to political and 
economic perils as the country lost business in 2020 due to the spread of COVID-19 in China. 
The EU-Mercosur agreement presents the opportunity for Mercosur’s largest member state to 
diversify its trade away from China and to curb China’s influence over the country.  
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 As previously stated, Brazil’s economy has greatly benefited from the US-China trade 
war. In terms of agricultural products to China, Brazil has mostly filled the void of the US by 
dominating soybean exports to China, which represents 35 percent of trade between the two 
countries.134 However, during 2018 and 2019, exports of commodities such as petroleum, meat, 
and iron ore to China have also increased to the point where the country is Brazil’s number one 
export partner accounting for 30 percent of all trade.135 However, this reliance on trade with 
China has led to worries about China’s influence. During Bolsonaro’s 2018 campaign, the sale of 
Brazil’s two largest hydroelectric dams to China’s Three Gorges Corp for 3.66 billion dollars, 
along with the sale of mines to various Chinese state firms, were used by Bolsonaro to call 
attention to Chinese investments.136 During former president, Temer’s final days, the president 
toyed with the idea of privatizing the country’s largest energy firm, Electrobras, which many 
Chinese companies were eager to purchase.137 China’s State Grid energy firm already owns 
arguably one of Brazil’s largest energy firms, CPFL Energia, but by purchasing Electrobras’ 
assets Chinese state-owned firms could potentially control nearly all of Brazil’s energy 
infrastructure. Thus, during his campaign and his presidency Bolsonaro has declared his 
approach to China as ‘pragmatic,’ willing to engage but cautious of the country’s overreach on 
Brazilian affairs.  
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Throughout 2019 relations with China and Bolsonaro had improved with Brazil hosting 
the 2019 BRICS summit and Bolsonaro agreeing to allow China’s Huawei to place bids for its 
5G cellular network system.138 However, COVID-19 has effected both Brazil’s economic and 
political relationship with China. The effects of COVID-19 have decimated Brazil’s commodity-
driven economy, and this is largely due to its dependence on China. While exports of some 
products such as soy, pork, beef, and cotton have increased to China during the crisis,139 overall 
exports of products such as oil have decreased by 45 percent since the crisis, and 18 percent of 
all Brazilian exports are down from over a year ago.140 In addition, China’s desire to control 
information surrounding COVID-19 has led to confrontations between members of Bolsonaro’s 
family and the Chinese government. This became evident when Bolsonaro’s son and member of 
congress, Eduardo Bolsonaro, tweeted that a 26-year-old man had died due to the “Chinese 
Virus.” China’s consular general to Brazil, Li Wang, wrote an op-ed in a Brazilian newspaper 
claiming that Bolsonaro had been “brain-washed in the United States” and threatened the 
congressman stating, “should any country insist on being China’s enemy, we will be its most 
sophisticated enemy!”141 This marked an aggressive turn in China’s diplomatic relations with 
Brazil, but more importantly, this has led to an increase in anti-Chinese rhetoric amongst 
Bolsonaro’s supporters.142 With political and trade relations with China tittering due to COVID-
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19, this illustrates why Brazil should diversify its trade away from China. The EU-Mercosur 
trade agreement represents the opportunity for Brazil to accomplish just that, which is why 
Bolsonaro is eager for Brazil and other Mercosur states to support the agreement.  
Like Europe, Brazil under Bolsonaro feels threatened by China’s increasing presence in 
the region and control over the Brazilian economy. The initial effects of COVID-19 on China’s 
imports of Brazilian products followed by a substantial decrease in economic activity due to 
quarantine have decimated Brazil’s chances for economic growth. As of June 2020, the Brazilian 
government expects the economy to contract by at least 6 percent, which represents the largest 
contraction in the country’s history.143 Members of the Economic ministry have predicted that 
losses this year will never fully be recovered.144 Bolsonaro’s liberal economic trade policies are 
also not likely to work in a post-COVID world. Already Bolsonaro’s government has approved a 
stimulus package worth 3.6 percent of the country’s GDP to alleviate the economic effects of 
COVID-19, and this spending plan will likely not be enough. The EU-Mercosur agreement 
provides the opportunity to seek trade with other partners. Therefore, Bolsonaro does desire to 
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CHAPTER 7: EUROPE’S LONG GAME
At present, there are a multitude of factors that could prohibit the agreement from 
succeeding, which include, but are not limited to, the economic effects of COVID-19. The 
pandemic has all but halted both international trade as well as trade within the EU. Ultimately 
the EU will need to bail out member states while attempting to prevent additional calls for a 
referendum to leave the EU from dissenting members such as Italy. Under these conditions, the 
future of the European Union appears grim.  
However, Latin America and in particular Brazil faces dire concerns from the spread of 
the virus. Brazil is now designated by the World Health Organization as a hotspot for the spread 
of COVID-19.145 Within Brazil, the national death rate continues to increase at an exponential 
pace with the country now achieving the second-highest death toll in the world due to COVID-
19.146 With the current approval rating for Bolsonaro reaching as low as 32 percent along with 
calls for impeachment due to evidence of abuse of power, Bolsonaro may not even last his full 
term.147 This means that the future of Brazil may be determined by the current vice president, 
Hamilton Mourão. There is also the possibility that in future elections, Brazil returns to a leftist 
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president. This would mean that the poor relationship which Macron faced with Bolsonaro may 
turn into a relationship with a leader who favors the EU’s environmental policies.  
 Thus, in the end while the EU is reeling economically from COVID-19, it is important to 
consider the long game. For example, the EU-Canada deal has yet to be ratified by all 
parliaments, and this agreement was concluded in 2014. The economic, as well as the political 
situation in Brazil, is likely to change due to the chaos and economic effects from COVID-19. 
This means a future leader may seek an improved environmental policy as well as improved 
relations with the European Union in order to diversify trade from China.  
 The EU should use its resources to promote human rights, democracy, and 
multilateralism at a time when these pillars appear to be crumbling. The EU should use its 
market to project its values, and during this health crisis utilizes its humanitarian resources to 
affect change in areas most affected by the spread of COVID-19 such as Brazil. Promotion of 
free-trade and the use of aid will provide the means to alleviate the spread of COVID-19 in Latin 
America and to show the world that the EU supports its partners in the region. Eventually, 
COVID-19 will pass, and so will populism in the form of Bolsonaro, yet competition with China 
in Latin America will remain. The EU-Mercosur free-trade agreement allows many European 
sectors to succeed. However, by allowing its agricultural sector to dominate this deal, the EU 
risks losing an agreement which gives promise to the idea of inter-regionalism. Only through 
compromise can the EU achieve its goals of inter-regionalism. Furthermore, increased trade is 
desperately needed by Mercosur member states especially following the loss of trade due to 
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